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Introduction 
This paper is an attempt to explain why development agencies have become 
increasingly concerned with establishing anti-money laundering (AML) regimes 
in developing countries. The agencies themselves argue that there is a 
significant developmental rationale for this concern. In fact, however, it is very 
hard to find any substantial evidence for the impact of money laundering on 
economic growth and development. This paper argues instead that the growing 
concern with money laundering on the part of development agencies is to be 
explained in terms of the ways in which western states are using development 
agencies to draw developing countries into an increasingly global regime of 
financial governance. This is driven by the ‘securitization’ of governance 
‘failures’ in developing countries in the post-September 11th context. In other 
words, the concern with money laundering on the part of development agencies 
is not really about ‘development’ at all; it is about security and governance. If 
this is right, then the example of money laundering raises an important question 
about the contemporary project of ‘international development’; especially as so 
much of this project is about the creation and recreation of patterns of domestic 
governance (in finance, trade, legal systems and so on), and the integration of 
developing countries into international regimes of governance (through 
harmonization and standardization for example). The question it raises is 
whether the pursuit of ‘governance’ has now become synonymous with 
‘development’. 
This paper begins by examining the ‘securitization of governance’. It then 
briefly sketches out the development of the international anti-money laundering 
regime, up to 2001. While in some respects this regime had developed quite 
quickly from the late 1980s, its major weaknesses were a lack of any substantial 
enforcement powers and a relatively narrow geographical focus. For the major 
western states, and especially the United States, these weaknesses became 
seen as particularly acute in the context of the events of September 11th 2001. 
The response of these states was to use the World Bank and the IMF as 
instruments for the incorporation of developing countries into the global anti-
money laundering regime. Given their near universal membership, their 
financial resources, and their extensive and on-going relationships with 
developing country governments, they are in an obviously privileged position to 
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pressure developing countries to create domestic anti-money laundering 
regimes. The concern with money laundering was subsequently adopted by 
almost all multi-lateral and bi-lateral development agencies. The paper then 
reviews the (very limited) evidence for the idea that anti-money laundering 
activities are grounded in a developmental rational, and argues instead that the 
concern with anti-money laundering is best seen as part of the process of the 
‘securitization of governance’.  
 
The ‘Securitization of Governance’ 
Within the discipline of International Relations, the term ‘securitization’ is 
associated with the work of Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and more generally what 
has become known as the ‘Copenhagen School’.1 In its simplest form a concern 
with ‘securitization’ involves an investigation into the ways in which issues, 
processes and events become seen as matters of ‘security’, and thus cast as 
existential threats that require special measures to address. By casting the 
study of ‘security’ in these terms the Copenhagen School consciously departs 
from the ‘traditional’ approach to security which has been to take threats as 
objectively there, and in general terms to see these threats as being essentially 
military threats to the territory, sovereignty or ‘interests’ of the state and its 
populace. The kinds of theoretical arguments used to advance this agenda for 
the study of security have been the subject of controversy.2 In particular the 
central concept of ‘societal security’, which rests on a notion of societal identity 
(which can be ‘threatened’) has been the subject of a variety of critiques.3  
                                                 
1 The key works here are Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Japp de Wilde, Security: A New 
Framework for Analysis (Boulder, CO, Lynne Rienner, 1998), Ole Waever, ‘Securitization and 
Desecuritization’, Ronnie Lipschutz (ed.), On Security (New York, Columbia University Press, 
1995), and Ole Waever, Barry Buzan, Morten Kelstrup and Pierre Lemaitre, Identity, Migration 
and the New Security Agenda in Europe (London, Palgrave Macmillan, 1993). 
2 Most significantly see Bill McSweeny, ‘Identity and Security: Buzan and the Copenhagen 
School’, Review of International Studies 22(1), 1996, 81-93, Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, 
‘Slippery? Contradictory? Sociologically Untenable? The Copenhagen School Replies’, Review 
of International Studies 23(2) 1997, 241-250, and Bill McSweeney, ‘Durkheim and the 
Copenhagen School: A Response to Buzan and Waever’, Review of International Studies 24 
(1), 1998, 137-140. For a commentary on these debates see Michael Williams, ‘Modernity, 
Identity and Security: A Comment on the “Copenhagen Controversy”’, Review of International 
Studies, 24(3), 1998, 435-439. For a more recent assessment of the theoretical underpinnings 
of ‘securitization’ see Holger Stritzel, ‘Towards a Theory Securitization: Copenhagen and 
Beyond’, European Journal of International Relations, 13(3), 2007, 357-383. 
3 See McSweeney, ‘Identity and Security’ and Lene Hanson, ‘The Little Mermaid’s Silent 
Security Dilemma and the Absence of Gender in the Copenhagen School’, Millennium 29(2) 
2000, 285-306. 
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Despite the energy that has gone into debating the idea of securitization, 
it remains uncertain if the full theoretical apparatus of the Copenhagen School 
is really essential to the project of pursuing empirical research into instances 
where events, processes and issues have become seen as security threats 
(‘securitized’). This article is not intended as contribution to the debates over the 
adequacy or otherwise of the Copenhagen School’s analysis of security. 
Nonetheless is does contend that, in recent years, something like a process of 
securitization has occurred with reference to the problems of ‘governance’ in the 
developing world, and more specifically, that governance ‘failures’ in the 
financial sector need to be overcome if money laundering is to be successfully 
controlled. In addition, as this has become ‘securitized’, so a new urgency has 
developed in the efforts by the G-7 states to tackle the problem of money 
laundering that manifests itself particularly in the recruitment of development 
agencies to this task. This is a narrower manifestation of what a number of 
commentators have identified as the ‘securitization of development’.4 
In recent years the problems of ‘weak’ states have become seen as 
some of the most pressing issues facing western governments. The 2002 White 
House National Security Strategy says that ‘the United States today is 
threatened less by conquering states than we are by weak and failing ones’.5 
Condoleeza Rice has argued that states which are incapable of exercising 
‘responsible sovereignty’ have a significant spillover effect in the form of 
terrorism, weapons proliferation and other dangers.6 In an especially revealing 
phrase, the US Pentagon is seeking to develop a strategy to deal with what its 
calls the world’s ‘ungoverned areas’.7 As USAID has put it: 
When development and governance fail in a country, the 
consequences engulf entire regions and leap across the world. 
Terrorism, political violence, civil wars, organized crime, drug 
                                                 
4 See for example, Mark Duffield, Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of 
Development and Security (London, Zed, 2001). 
5 The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, 
DC, 2002). 
6 ‘A Conversation with Condoleeza Rice’, The American Interest, (Autumn 2005) 47-50. 
7 Stewart Patrick, ‘Weak States and Global Threats Assessing Evidence of “Spillovers”’, Centre 
for Global Development Working Paper, 73, Washington, DC, Centre for Global Development, 
2006, p. 4. The parallel here with Mark Duffield’s phrase ‘governing the borderlands’ is obvious. 
See Mark Duffield, ‘Governing the Borderland: Decoding the Power of Aid’, Disasters 25(4), 
2001, 308-320. 
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trafficking, infectious diseases, environmental crises, refugee 
flows and mass migrations cascade across the borders of weak 
states more destructively then ever before.8 
The United Nations Secretary General’s High Level Panel argued that 
‘successful international actions to battle poverty, fight infectious diseases, stop 
transnational crime, rebuild after civil war, reduce terrorism, and halt the spread 
of dangerous materials all require capable, responsible states as partners’.9 Kofi 
Annan himself has said that ‘one of the great challenges of the new millennium 
it to ensure that all states are strong enough to meet the many challenges they 
face’.10 This suggests that ‘governance’ failures in ‘weak’ states have become 
increasing seen as the source of a series of ‘threats’ to the security and settled 
well-being of western states.11 
In terms of the governance of finance and banking, Williams Wechsler, 
former Special Adviser to the Secretary of the Treasury, has argued that ‘weak 
banking systems and poor supervision’ are a ‘growing threat to American 
interests’, not just in terms of their contribution to financial crises but also in 
terms of ‘the problems that global financial abuses present to U.S. Law 
enforcement and national security’.12 Weschler argues that these problems 
include the international drugs trade, multinational crime, the financing of 
terrorism, corruption, threats to US strategic interests, and the undermining of 
effective sanctions regimes.13 The US Department of Treasury has said that 
‘following the terrorist attacks … we also recognize that the fight against money 
laundering is integral to the war on terror’.14  The 2001 United States National 
Money Laundering Strategy said that ‘[l]aw enforcement cannot limit its fight 
against money laundering to domestic efforts’: 
                                                 
8 USAID, Foreign Aid in the National Interest: Promoting Freedom, Security and Opportunity 
(USAID, Washington DC, 2003). 
9 Secretary General’s High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A More Secure 
World: Our Shared Responsibility (New York, United Nations, 2004), emphasis added. 
10 Kofi Annan, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security, and Human Rights for All 
(New York, United Nations, 2005), emphasis added. 
11 Whether they actually are threats is another matter. See Patrick, ‘Weak States and Global 
Threats’. 
12 Williams F Wechsler, ‘Follow the Money’, Foreign Affairs July/August 2001, pp. 44, p. 46. 
13 Weschler, ‘Follow the Money’, pp. 44-48 
14 US Department of Treasury, 2002 National Money Laundering Strategy (Washington, DC, 
Department of Treasury, 2002), p. 3. 
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Money launderers also take advantage of the laws and protection 
of foreign states to escape investigation and prosecution. Various 
nation-states have critical deficiencies in their anti-money 
laundering regimes: they have not enacted laws that prohibit 
money laundering; they do not aggressively enforce existing anti-
money laundering legislation; or they fail to cooperate 
internationally to investigate and prosecute money launderers at 
large.15 
The 2002 United States Money Laundering Strategy said that ‘money 
laundering is a problem of global dimensions that requires concerted and 
cooperative action on the part of a broad range of institutions’.16 United States 
Attorney General John Ashcroft said in August 2001, that ‘money laundering 
constitutes a serious threat to our communities, to the integrity of our financial 
institutions and to our national security’. Fighting money laundering, he said, is 
‘more than a bloodless exercise in accounting’: ‘when we fight money 
laundering we fight organized crime. When we fight money laundering we keep 
drugs out of out playgrounds … We keep weapons out of the hands of 
terrorists’.17 As Hilary Benn put it, ‘it is in everybody’s interests to help 
developing countries to put in place strong anti-money laundering mechanisms 
and monitoring’.18 There seems to be a clear view, at least on the part of the 
US, that poor supervision and regulation of financial and banking systems in 
developing states poses a threat to US security. 
 
The International Anti-Money Laundering Regime19 
The international anti-money laundering regime has been developing since the 
late 1980s.20 At the heart of this regime is the Financial Action Task Force 
                                                 
15 The Office of Enforcement, US Department of Treasury, The 2001 National Money 
Laundering Strategy, Washington DC, US Department of Treasury, September 2001, p. 38. 
16 US Department of Treasury, US Department of Justice, 2002 National Money Laundering 
Strategy (Washington, DC, 2001), p. 46. 
17 John Ashcroft, prepared remarks, Organized Crime Conference, Chicago, IL, August 7, 2001. 
18 Hilary Benn, ‘Money Laundering as a Threat to International Development’, Speech to the 
‘Stop Money Laundering’ Conference, London, February, 2002. 
19 Here I follow a loose but nonetheless fairly conventional understanding of the term ‘regime’. I 
simply mean a connected set of rules, institutions and practices designed to ‘govern’ a particular 
issues area.  
20 Although the US first criminalized money laundering in 1986 as part of a campaign against 
drug trafficking. 
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(FATF). 21 FATF was founded in 1989 by the G7 states with the purpose of 
examining money laundering techniques and trends and setting out measures 
that should be taken to combat money laundering. In 1990 FATF issued ‘Forty 
Recommendations’, and these recommendations form the basis for all domestic 
and regional anti-money laundering (AML) regimes. The recommendations 
cover three areas: first, the legal system (essentially the criminalization of 
money laundering); second measures to be taken by financial institutions and 
other organizations (accountancy firms and banks for example) to prevent 
money laundering (essentially customer due diligence and reporting 
requirements); third, measures to be taken by governments and regulatory 
agencies (essentially the creation of effective domestic regulatory bodies and a 
commitment to international cooperation). The members of FATF generally 
complied with the forty recommendations, at least on paper, despite the fact 
that the recommendations were non-binding.22  
There are now also eight FAFT-style regional bodies, including a 
Caribbean Financial Action Task Force, established in 1992, an Asia/Pacific 
Group, established in 1997, a South American Financial Action Task Force, 
created in 2000, an East and South African Anti-Money laundering Group, 
established in 1999, a Eurasian Group, established in 2004, and a Middle-East 
and North African Financial Action Task Force, again established in 2004. 
There have also been three EU directives on countering money laundering, the 
last of which was issued in October 2005. These regional bodies have tended to 
adopt the FATF 40 recommendations and supplement with specific additional 
recommendations of special relevance to the region concerned. For example, 
the latest EU Directive states that ‘Community action should continue to take 
particular account of the Recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force’ 
and that the EU guidelines should be in line with these standards.23 Alongside 
FATF and the regional FATF-style institutions, are two other institutions that 
                                                 
21 For more on FATF see Thomas Biersteker and Sue Eckert (eds.), Countering the Financing 
of Global Terrorism (London, Routledge, 2006). See also www.fatf-gafi.org.  
22 Eric Helleiner, ‘The Politics of Global Financial Regulation: Lessons from the Fight Against 
Money Laundering’, John Eatwell and Lance Taylor (eds.), International Capital Markets: 
Systems in Transition (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002). Although, of course, this does 
not mean that money laundering has in fact been eradicated in those states.  
23 Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 October 2005 on 
the Prevention of the Use of the Financial System for the Purpose of Money Laundering and 
Terrorist Financing. 
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form part of the global anti-money laundering regime. The first is the Egmont 
Group.24 This was established in 1995 and is a group of Financial Intelligence 
Units (FIUs) that cooperate together on money laundering. The second is the 
Wolfsberg Group which is a group of international banks who agreed in 2000 to 
cooperate on principles and procedures to combat money laundering and the 
financing of terrorism.25  
There are a number of features of this regime worth noting. The first is 
the stress laid on domestic governance as the key to reducing money 
laundering. That is, the regime does not attempt to control the flow of money 
across borders, but rather it seeks to improve the capacity of governments to 
investigate and prosecute money laundering within their own domestic financial 
system. In this way, of course, the regime seeks to reduce money laundering 
‘without impeding in any way the freedom of capital movements’.26 Second, the 
regime has at its heart the international harmonization of domestic laws and 
practices; this is the significance of the FATF recommendations. Third, the 
regime described above only really covers a relatively small number of states 
and institutions. FATF only has 33 member countries. The Egmont Group only 
covers FIUs. The Wolfsberg Group only has twelve (albeit important) members.  
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, FATF as originally established 
had no significant enforcement powers over jurisdictions that did not sign up to 
its standards.27  The first serious attempt to expand the geographical scope of 
the anti-money laundering regime occurred in 2000. In the run-up to the G-7 
conference in July of that year, FATF was asked by the G-7 to review those 
countries that ‘resisted global efforts to combat money laundering’.28 The 
expansion of the mandate of FATF resulted in the development of a set of 
criteria for identifying ‘uncooperative nations’. As a result of this 29 states were 
originally identified as ‘Non-Cooperative Countries and Territories’ (NCCTs). At 
the July 2000 meeting the G-7 states threatened these NCCTs with various 
measures, including restricting financial transactions with these states, and 
                                                 
24 For information see www.egmontgroup.org. 
25 For information see www.wolsberg-principles.com. 
26 FATF, recommendation no. 22. 
27 Edwin Truman, ‘Anti-Money Laundering as a Global Public Good’, Global Public Goods 
Taskforce, Expert paper Series, Financial Stability (International Taskforce on Global Public 
Goods, Stockholm, 2006). 
28 Weschler, ‘Follow the Money’, p. 50 
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conditioning support from the IFIs in progress towards the FATF 
recommendations.29 It is clear that the G-7 were becoming more concerned with 
money laundering before the events of September 11th 2001. Nonetheless, the 
international anti-money laundering regime had within it only a relatively under-
developed set of instruments for getting countries outside of its membership to 
actually implement and enforce the FATF recommendations. 
The events of September 11th provided a new urgency to the task of 
expanding the geographical scope of the anti-money laundering regime. First, a 
concern with countering the financing of terrorism (CFT) was immediately 
added to the existing AML regime. In October 2001 FAFT issued ‘eight special 
recommendations’ concerned with terrorist financing (with a ninth added in 
2004). These include the ratification of 1999 UN Convention for the 
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, measures to freeze and confiscate 
terrorist assets, enhanced international cooperation, and domestic regulatory 
measures related to alternative remittance systems, wire transfers, the funding 
of non-profit organizations and cash couriers. In this way an immediate and 
significant link was made between money laundering and the financing of 
terrorist groups, and the concern with money laundering on the part of the 
United States shifted from the ‘war on drugs’ to the ‘war on terror’.30 Second, 
September 11th was the catalyst for an attempt by the developed states to 
expand and strengthen the global AML regime by using development agencies, 
initially the World Bank and IMF, as instruments to create domestic AML 
regimes in developing countries.31 
 
Development Agencies and Anti-Money Laundering 
The World Bank and the IMF had been only marginally concerned with money 
laundering before September 2001. In 1995 the World Bank produced a short 
paper on money laundering.32 In 1998 Michel Camdessus, the then Managing 
                                                 
29 Weschler, ‘Follow the Money’, p. 51. 
30 See, Peter Shields, ‘When the “Information Revolution” and the US Security State Collide: 
Money Laundering and the Proliferation of Surveillance’, New Media and Society, 7(4) 2005, 
483-512. 
31 See William Holder, ‘The International Monetary Fund’s Involvement in Combating Money 
Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism’, Journal of Money Laundering Control 6(4) 2003, 
383-387 
32 World Bank, ‘Money Laundering and International Efforts to Fight it’, Public Policy for the 
Private Sector note 48, May 1995. 
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Director of the IMF, argued that money laundering threatened the smooth 
functioning of financial markets. He also argued that in an era of ‘globalization’ 
‘all countries must participate – and participate enthusiastically’ in prevention 
strategies. He also argued that ‘the global nature of the IMF’s surveillance and 
technical assistance activities’ provided an opportunity to pressure governments 
to adopt effective anti-money laundering legislation.33 In September 2000, as a 
direct outcome of the G-7 meeting in July, the International Monetary and 
Financial Committee asked the Bank and Fund to prepare a joint paper on their 
respective roles in combating money laundering and financial crime.34 This 
paper was discussed by the Development Committee in April 2001.35 At that 
meeting it was agreed that ‘money laundering is a problem of global concern’ 
and that national and international efforts which ‘will require a cooperative 
approach involving many different institutions given the cross-cutting agenda – 
encompassing financial sector supervision and regulation, good governance, 
judicial and legal reform and effective law enforcement’.36  
 This represented the first concerted effort by the major shareholders of 
the Bank and the Fund, especially the US, to get these institutions to take a 
more significant role in countering money laundering. It is equally significant that 
at this time (2000, early 2001) there was also substantial resistance on the part 
of many member states, especially the developing countries, to making AML 
activities a formal party of Fund and especially Bank operations.37 The reasons 
for this resistance are reasonably clear: the developing countries did not want 
the Bank and Fund to generate additional ‘conditionalities’. In addition, a 
number of states objected that in fact neither the Fund nor the Bank had any 
real expertise in this area. The opposition to making AML a part of Fund and 
Bank operations was successful, at least initially. However, after September 
11th this opposition was overcome. ‘Industrial countries and the G7 in particular, 
                                                 
33 Michel Camdessus, ‘Money Laundering: the Importance of International Countermeasures’, 
address to the plenary meeting of the Financial Action Task Force, Paris, February 10, 1998. 
34 The International Monetary and Financial Committee is composed of governors of the IMF. 
35 ‘Enhancing Contributions to Combating Money Laundering: Policy Paper’, paper prepared by 
World Bank/IMF staff for the Development Committee Meeting, April 30, 2001. The 
Development Committee is a Joint Ministerial Committee of the Governors of the Fund and the 
Bank whose remit is to advise the Board of Governors on ‘critical development issues’ 
36 World Bank, ‘Proposed Action Plan for Enhancing the Bank’s Ability to Respond to Clients in 
Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism’, World Bank paper, 2001. 
37 Marco Arnone and Pier Carlo Padoan, ‘Anti-Money Laundering by International Institutions: A 
Preliminary Assessment’, CIDEI Working Paper no. 74, CIDEI Rome, February 2007, p. 8. 
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could now force the others to agree on a consensus for reasons that went 
beyond “simple” financial stability’.38 
At a November 2001 meeting of the Development Committee, ministers 
stressed the need for the Bank and Fund to do more to help countries identify 
and address money laundering and the financing of terrorism. The US has been 
quite open about its desire to use development agencies to tackle money 
laundering.: ‘The United States will coordinate with G-7 and FATF members to 
ensure that the IMF and World Bank incorporates the Forty Recommendations 
into their operational work and promote the Forty Recommendations as the 
international standard’; the Department of Treasury will ‘help foster and 
implement initiatives focused on money laundering and financial abuse … by 
the Multilateral Development Banks’.39 ‘Well conceived and targeted aid is a 
potential leveraging instrument that can help countries implement sound 
policies’.40 In January 2002 the Bank’s Board accepted that that AML/CFT work 
was within the Bank’s mandate. In August 2002 the Bank Board added money 
laundering and terrorist financing to the list of 11 areas where standards and 
codes are useful to the Bank’s work, and agreed to adopt the FATF ‘40+8’ 
Recommendations. Later the same year the IMF and World Bank agreed to 
undertake a one-year pilot project for assessing compliance with FAFT 
standards. What this meant was that FATF was essentially contracting out its 
assessments of compliance with the 40+8 recommendations to the IMF and the 
World Bank. 
When the World Bank started including assessment of AML/CFT regimes 
into its FSAPs it found that a ‘fairly high percentage’ of countries were failing in 
one way or another to provide adequate mechanisms for dealing with these 
problems. Among the shortcomings identified were: 
• poor assistance provided to other countries investigations into terrorist 
financing; 
• poor attention given to transactions with ‘higher risk countries’; 
                                                 
38 Arnone and Padoan, ‘Anti-Money Laundering by International Institutions’, p. 9. 
39 2001 National Money Laundering Strategy, p. 46-7. 
40 E. Anthony Wayne, Assistant Secretary for Economic and Business Affairs, ‘Money 
Laundering and Terrorist Financing in the Middle East and South Asia’, Testimony before the 
Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, July 13, 2005. 
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• poor detection and analysis of unusually larger or otherwise suspicious 
transactions; 
• failure to criminalize the financing of terrorism; 
• inadequate AML supervision of banks and other financial institutions; 
• inadequate measures to freeze and confiscate terrorist assets; 
• inadequate ‘internal policies, procedures, controls, audits and training 
programs’.41 
The methodology use to make these assessments contains over 250 criteria 
and is extraordinarily detailed. For example, it includes criteria concerning the 
conduct of customer due diligence with respect to when it is to be conducted, 
how long it should take, what to do with existing customers, the conditions 
under which certain exemptions may be granted, and when financial institutions 
can rely on third party assessments.42 
In March 2004, the World Bank and the IMF agreed to make the pilot 
programme permanent and more wide-ranging, most particularly it agreed to 
integrate assessment of criminal law enforcement into its appraisal documents. 
Both the World Bank and the IMF are now integrating the results of FSAPs, into 
their Country Assistance Strategies. This means that progress towards the 
establishment of an effective domestic anti-money laundering regime is 
explicitly part of the World Bank’s objectives in its borrower countries, and 
progress towards the achievement of this has become one of the numerous 
performance indicators used by the Bank to assess the progress of these 
countries. 
The World Bank has also expanded its technical assistance provision in 
the areas of money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism.43 
Between 2002 and 2004 the World Bank and IMF delivered technical 
assistance to 63 individual countries, and undertook 32 regional technical 
assistance projects.44 This technical assistance was directed at the 
establishment of AML/CFT laws and regulations that met international best 
                                                 
41 World Bank/IMF, Financial Sector Assessment: A Handbook (Washington, DC, World 
Bank/IMF, 2005), p. 213. 
42 World Bank/IMF, Financial Sector Assessment: A Handbook, pp. 214-5. 
43 For more on this see, IMF/World Bank, Reference Guide to Anti-Money Laundering (AML)  
and Combating and Financing of Terrorism (CFT) (Washington, DC, World Bank/IMF, 2006). 
44 IMF/World Bank, Reference Guide to AML and CFT. 
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practices, capacity building for financial sector supervisory and regulatory 
authorities, the establishment of financial intelligence units, as well as public 
awareness and training programs in the public and private sectors.45 The World 
Bank has been undertaking a number of research programmes that feed into 
and amplify this new concern with money laundering and terrorist financing. For 
example, it has been conducting research into the Haawala exchange system 
with the explicit aim of identifying the characteristics that make it vulnerable to 
financial abuse and to consider the appropriate regulatory and legal options.46 
The World Bank’s interest in the Hawala money exchange system is matched 
by a growing concern on the part of the US government and INTERPOL.47 It 
has also conducted research into how AML/CFT activities can be integrated into 
micro finance institutions.48 
Almost all other bi-lateral aid development agencies have followed the 
World Bank and IMF into AML/CFT work. Towards the end of 2006, the British 
Department for International Development (DfID) agreed to contribute £6 million 
over three years to the joint City of London and Metropolitan Police Force 
International Corruption Group. The money will be used to pay for police officers 
who will work in the Proceeds of Corruption Unit which tackles money 
laundering in the City of London.49  More generally, DfID has committed itself to 
‘tackling corruption, bribery and money laundering’.50 NORAD has funded a 
research project examining the extent of money laundering in Southern Africa 
                                                 
45 See, IMF/World Bank, ‘Twelve-Month Pilot Program of Anti-Money Laundering and 
Combating the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) Assessments: Joint Report on the Review of 
the Pilot Program’, March 10, 2004. See also World Bank, Effective Regimes to Combat Money 
Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism: Strengthening the Collaborative Process 
(Washington, DC, World Bank, 2004). 
46 Samuel Munzle Maimbo, ‘The Money Exchange Dealers of Kabul: A Study of the Hawala 
System in Afghanistan’, World Bank, June 2003. See also Daniel Kaufman, ‘Governance in the 
Financial Sector: The Broader Context of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing’, Draft 
Paper, December 2002. 
47 Lisa Carroll, ‘Alternative Remittance Systems: Distinguishing Sub-Systems of Ethnic Money 
Laundering in Interpol Member Countries on the Asian Continent’, Interpol, 30 July, 2004. 
48 See Raul Hernandez-Coss, Chinyere Egwuagu, Jennifer Isen and David Porteous, AML/CFT 
Regulation: Implications for Financial Service Providers that Serve Low-Income People 
(Washington DC, World Bank, 2005). 
49 DfID, ‘Combating International Corruption UK Action Plan for 2006/7 – Interim Progress 
Report’, London, DfID, 2006. 
50 DfID, Eliminating World Poverty: Making Governance Work for the Poor (London, DfID, 2006), 
p. 33.  
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which was undertaken by the Institute for Security Studies in South Africa.51 
USAID has been extensively involved (as one would expect) in tackling money 
laundering. To give just one example it has been providing technical assistance 
to Indonesia’s FIU, the Ministry of Finance, and the Indonesian Attorney 
General’s Office to boost their capacity to tackle money laundering.52 
Similarly, most of the other multilateral development banks have also 
become concerned with combating money laundering and terrorist financing. 
Apart from the usual raft of training programmes and ‘dialogues’, the Inter-
American Development Bank has funded projects to support the creation and 
development of a number of financial intelligence units in its member states.53 
The Asian Development Bank has been similarly concerned with money 
laundering.54 The African Development Bank has been pursuing anti-money 
laundering activities through the new Economic Partnership for African 
Development (NEPAD). In particular it has pursued implementation of 
international standards and codes in the banking and financial sectors in Africa, 
including the adoption of the FATF recommendations.55 So, for example, the 
extent to which an African country has implemented an anti-money laundering 
law, and the extent to which it has established a financial intelligence unit to 
investigate money laundering and other financial crimes are explicit criteria in 
the assessment of African countries through the NEPAD Peer Review 
Mechanism.  
 It is worth noting at this stage two important facets of this development. 
First, it provides significant additional evidence for the emergence of a more 
tightly integrated ‘development community’. Dissenting voices among significant 
development institutions have almost vanished as there has been increasing 
policy convergence among bi-lateral and multilateral development agencies, 
                                                 
51 Charles Goredema, ‘Money Laundering in East and Southern Africa: A Preliminary Overview 
of the Threat’, Institute of Security Studies, Cape Town, August 2002. 
52 USAID, ‘Indonesia: Financial Crime Prevention Project, June 2004-June 2008’, Washington, 
DC, USAID, 2004. 
53 Inter-American Development Bank, IDB America, March 16, 2007. 
54 See Asian Development Bank, ‘Enhancing the Asian Development Bank’s Role in Combating 
Money Laundering’, ADB, March 2003. 
55 African Development Bank Group, ‘Framework for the Implementation of Banking and 
Financial Standards in Africa’, report prepared for the NEPAD Steering Committee, 27th June, 
2002. 
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and many development NGOs.56 This is a significant change from the 1980s 
when there was a great deal more disagreement among development agencies. 
There has also been a dramatic rise in cooperation between development 
agencies, and between development agencies and NGOs. This is illustrated 
clearly by the growing interest in establishing formal cooperation and policy 
harmonization frameworks, both at the institutional level and in terms of country 
operations.57 It is also illustrated by the PRSP process within which almost all 
development agencies and very many NGOs have become willing 
participants.58 Increasingly, recipient countries face donors as a single bloc who 
all have the same policies and who are increasingly cooperating among 
themselves.  
Second, the example of money laundering also shows how development 
agencies have become part of a broader network of agencies pursuing the 
governance of money laundering. There are other states agencies involved 
(DoJ, DoS, FCO), NGOs (Transparency International), Interpol and other 
policing agencies. This provides further evidence for the ways in which the 
creation of regimes of governance takes place through networks of sometimes 
very diverse agencies; in this case state and non-state, domestic and 
international, developmental and law enforcement.59 Some of this is hardly new. 
States have always used development agencies for goals other than 
‘development’. But it is nonetheless illustrative of drive to incorporate 
developing countries into regimes of global governance and illustrative of the 
ways in which development agencies have been recruited to do this. 
 
Development or Governance? 
The development agencies have argued that this anti-money laundering activity 
has a development rationale. The World Bank, for example, has said that 
‘money laundering has potentially devastating economic, political and social 
                                                 
56 Exactly why this has been the case has not been adequately explored. For one case study 
see Janne Jokinen, ‘Balancing between East and West: The Asian Development Bank’s Policy 
on Good Governance’, Morten Boas and Desmond McNeil (eds.), Global Institutions and 
Development: Framing the World? (London, Routledge, 2004) 
57 See, OECD, Harmonising Donor Practices for Effective Aid Delivery (Paris, OECD, 2003). 
58 David Craig and Doug Porter, ‘Poverty Reduction Strategy papers: A New Convergence’, 
World Development 31(1) 2003, 53-69. 
59 See, for example, Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order, (Princeton, NJ, Princeton 
University Press, 2004) 
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consequences’.60 The Asian Development Bank has said that ‘money 
laundering poses a serious threat to sound economic development’.61 
 [I]t is clear that such activity damages the financial-sector 
institutions that are critical to economic growth, reduces 
productivity in the economy’s real sector by diverting resources 
and encouraging crime and corruption, which slow economic 
growth and can distort the economy’s external sector – 
international trade and capital flows – to the detriment of long-term 
development.62 
This argument yokes together a series of claims that hinge on the role that the 
financial sector plays in economic development. A similar argument has been 
made in an IMF paper, where it is claimed that money laundering can distort 
economic data and thus distort policymaking, that it can lead to an erosion of 
confidence in financial markets, and that it can depress economic growth 
rates.63 The most comprehensive statement by the World Bank about the 
developmental impacts of money laundering argues that money laundering 
increases crime and corruption, damages a countries reputation with 
consequences for foreign direct investment, weakens financial institutions 
creating increased risks, distorts investment, and damages privatization 
efforts’.64 
These arguments illustrate exactly what Dani Rodrik has argued in a 
number of places. It is that ‘foreign trade and investment have become the 
ultimate yardstick for evaluating social and economic policies of governments in 
developing countries’.65 Development agencies now routinely justify the 
construction of domestic governance regimes in a whole host of sectors on the 
basis that they are necessary for ‘investor confidence’ which in turn is seen as 
                                                 
60 IMF/World Bank, Reference Guide to Anti-Money Laundering (AML) and Combating the 
Financing of Terrorism (CFT), chapter 10. 
61 Asian Development Bank, ‘Enhancing the Asian Development Bank’s Role in Combating 
Money Laundering’, p. 3. 
62 Brent Bartlett, ‘The Negative Effects of Money Laundering on Economic Development’, Asian 
Development Bank, 2002, p. 1. 
63 Peter Quirk, ‘Macroeconomic Implications of Money Laundering’, IMF Working paper 96/66, 
June 1996. See also Peter Quirk, ‘Money Laundering: Muddying the Macroeconomy’, Finance 
and Development, 34(1), 1997. 
64 IMF/World Bank, Reference Guide to Anti-Money Laundering (AML) and Combating the 
Financing of Terrorism (CFT), chapter 2. 
65 Dani Rodrik, ‘Trading in Illusions’, Foreign Policy, March/April, 2001, p. 55. 
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necessary for growth. In this view ‘joining the world economy is no longer a 
matter of simply dismantling barriers to trade and investment. Countries now 
must also comply with a long list of admission requirements from new patent 
rules to more rigorous banking standards’. The implication of this, for Rodrik, is 
that ‘global integration has become, for all practice purposes, a substitute for a 
development strategy’.66 It is not just that as an account of the process of 
‘development’ this is remarkably thin, it is, as Rodrik has pointed out, not well 
grounded in the evidence.67  
Certainly the evidence for the developmental impact of money laundering 
is not at all clear. This is almost inevitable given the very obvious difficulties, 
first, of actually measuring the extent of money laundering in any particular 
country, and second, of then designing robust enough tests of its impact on 
development variables, especially given that many developing countries have a 
host of ‘imperfections’ in their financial systems, and also given that 
‘development’ is the result of a highly complex causal process.68 Given that the 
contribution of the ‘financial sector’ to ‘development’ is itself unclear, it is hard to 
know how an accurate assessment of the impact of money laundering on 
development could be made. Even those who argue that money laundering can 
have negative consequences for development have admitted that ‘the negative 
economic affects of money laundering in economic development are difficult to 
quantify’.69 One attempt to quantity the impact of money laundering on growth 
rates found that the correlation varied with different sets of sample states.70 
In addition of course, there are potentially significant costs to developing 
countries from participating in the international AML regime. These too are very 
hard to quantify, but would include costs borne by governments, the private 
sector and the general public. One very crude estimate of the costs to the 
United States of combating money laundering is $7 billion or about $25 per 
                                                 
66 Rodrik, ‘Trading in Illusions’, p. 55. 
67 Rodrik, ‘Trading in Illusions’, and Dani Rodrik, ‘Globalisation, Social Conflict and Economic 
Growth’, World Economy, 21(2) 1998, 143-158. 
68 See Charles Kenny and David Williams, ‘What Do We Know About Economic Growth? Or, 
Why Don’t We Know very Much?’ World Development, 29(1) 2001, 1-22. 
69 Bartlett, ‘The Negative Effects of Money Laundering’, p. 1. 
70 Luiz Cavalcante Veiga and Joaquim Andrade, ‘Money Laundering, Corruption and Growth: 
An Empirical Rationale for a Global Convergence on Anti-Money Laundering Regulation’, 
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capita.71 As Edwin Truman has argued, ‘even if the true figure was less than 
half for developing countries, say $10 per capita, this is still a considerable 
amount to pay to participate fully in the global AML regime’ compared, for 
example, with per capita health or education expenditures.72 As Rodrik has 
argued, ‘setting institutional priorities to maximize integration into the global 
economy has real opportunity costs’.73 Much more work would need to be done 
by those advocating the incorporation of developing countries into the global 
AML to show that the costs of participating in this regime really are worth 
bearing because of their developmental benefits. None of this implies that 
extensive money laundering cannot have developmental impacts. In some 
countries and in some cases it may well do. It is just to say that there is no 
really any good evidence to support this as a general argument; and it is hard to 
see how such evidence might be collected. In turn then, there seems little 
general developmental rationale for development agencies to be pursuing AML 
activities in developing countries. 
 If the pursuit of AML by development agencies is not about development, 
then what is it about? We can push the arguments that Rodrik has made a little 
further. The case of money laundering suggests not just that development 
policy has become synonymous with integration into the global economy via the 
opening of borders and the harmonization of domestic regulatory regimes; it is 
rather that the pursuit of anti-money laundering in developing countries is not 
about ‘development’ at all. It is about governance in the pursuit of security for 
western states. In other words rather than fulfilling their mandate as 
development agencies (albeit by pursuing a very inadequate set of policies), 
these agencies have become instruments in the creation of regimes of 
governance that respond to perceived threats to western security. And, as 
Rodrik has suggested, this is not a costless exercise for developing countries. 
The opportunity costs of implementing these AML regimes is what other, 
perhaps more persuasively developmental, purposes these resources could 
have been put to. 
 
                                                 
71 See Peter Reuter and Edwin Truman, Chasing Dirty Money: The Fight Against Money 
Laundering (Institute for International Economics, Washington, DC, 2004), chapter 4. 
72 Truman, ‘Money Laundering as a Global Public Good’, p. 96. 
73 Rodrik, ‘Trading in Illusions’, p. 56. 
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Conclusion 
There is, of course no especially good reason to think that development 
agencies will be terribly effective in constructing effective AML regimes in 
developing countries.74  Even if such effective domestic regimes can be 
constructed, it is not clear how much difference will they make to the extent of 
money laundering within the international financial system. Whatever doubts 
may remain, however, about the real effectiveness of this attempt to construct 
domestic anti-money laundering regimes in developing countries, there is no 
reason at all to suppose that it is going to go away. The international AML 
regime continues to develop, illustrated most graphically by the 2006 United 
Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC). Article 14 of UNCAC states 
that signatories shall ‘institute a comprehensive domestic regulatory and 
supervisory regime … in order to detect and deter all forms of money 
laundering’, and that in establishing such a regime State Parties are called upon 
to ‘use as a guideline the relevant initiatives of regional, interregional and 
multilateral organizations against money laundering’. It also states that State 
Parties shall ‘develop and promote global, regional, subregional and bilateral 
cooperation among judicial, law enforcement and financial regulatory authorities 
in order to combat money laundering’.75 The Legislative Guide that 
accompanied UNCAC specifically refers to the FATF Recommendations.76 
Second, development agencies involved in trying to create AML regimes in 
developing countries are not deterred by failure or slow progress. One of the 
characteristics of international development activity is its reflexive character. Of 
course reflexivity does not mean these agencies will be successful, but it does 
mean that, up to a point at least, they try to learn how to be more successful. 
But we should be aware that what they are trying to learn how to do better is not 
development at all; rather it is governance in the pursuit of security. 
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